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Abstract
As biometric-based authentication is gaining popularity, the need to protect privacy of such
data is widely recognized. Recently a large body of work has emerged on securing biometric
data stored at a server that performs biometric-based authentication (such that the biometric
data cannot be recovered by someone with legitimate access to the server or in case of break-in).
While prior work concentrated on authentication, in this work we treat the problem of biometric
identiﬁcation, or matching, which is also of a signiﬁcant importance. We present our solutions
for iris matching for cases when a single and multiple servers are available for computation, and
empirically validate our techniques on an database of iris codes.
1 Introduction
The need for individual privacy is widely recognized. With biometric authentication becoming
more reliable and readily available than before, the need to protect such information is apparent.
Furthermore, unlike other types of data used for authentication purposes (passwords, key material,
secure tokens, etc.), biometric data cannot be revoked and replaced with a new value, which calls
for even stricter protection of such data.
In recent years a signiﬁcant amount of research eﬀort has been dedicated to protecting biometric
data from the server that stores a database with biometric templates for authentication purposes.
The idea is, instead of storing the biometrics themselves, to store a function of each biometric such
that the value can be used for authentication purposes, but in case of server compromise it does
not lead to compromise of the biometric data. Such solutions include work on fuzzy vault [17, 7, 8],
secure sketches and fuzzy extractors [18, 12, 2, 13, 3, 11], shielding functions [20, 24, 23], cancelable
or revocable biometrics [21], and many other publications derived from them, especially in the
biometrics literature.
In this work we articulate that concentrating on authentication alone is not enough, and there
is a need to protect sensitive biometric data in other environments and contexts where computation
over biometric data, normally for the purposes of matching, is involved. For instance, testing new
algorithms for extracting biometric features on large collections of biometric images requires massive
amount of computation and, more importantly, has memory requirements beyond a single machine,
which forces such computations to be placed on a grid [4]. Computers comprising the grid, however,
are normally much less trusted to preserve the privacy of the data than machines controlled by
the researcher and thus it is necessary secure the data used by the machines connected to the grid
while computing the task. Another scenario arises in cases where the biometrics data is placed at
an external server (for computational or other reasons) and there is a need to search the database
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police oﬃcer who takes a picture at the crime scene and wishes to know whether the person appears
among individuals associated with cases under investigation which may involve searching databases
collected by diﬀerent entities). This can also be generalized to the case where two organizations
that do not completely trust each other with their sensitive data (or are prohibited from disclosing
the data by law or other provisions) would like to ﬁnd out whether certain individuals appear in
both of their respective databases (e.g., databases containing data gathered from investigations by
two diﬀerent entities).
In all of the above cases, given a particular biometric, the server is to search the database and
output information about matches. We wish both the biometric templates stored in the server
database and the biometric being searched for to stay hidden from the server performing the
search. Existing techniques summarized above achieve secrecy of the stored data from the server
when an individual is to authenticate against her own record, but cannot be extended to the case
of identiﬁcation, where the entire database is to be searched for possible matches with the given
biometric. The latter case is thus the focus of this work.
Since biometric-based identiﬁcation techniques heavily depend on the type of biometric used,
we concentrate on iris-based matching. Iris is attractive due to a large amount of uncertainty an
individual biometric contains (some other types of biometric cannot be used for identiﬁcation due
to high error rates and are only suitable for veriﬁcation) and is likely to be more prevalent than
some other types of biometrics. Additionally, after extracting features from an iris image, it is
represented as a binary string, which makes it convenient to work with. Throughout this work,
we will use biometric reading to denote raw biometric data, biometric representation to denote
processed biometric (i.e., after feature extraction). We may also refer to (processed) biometric data
stored in a database as biometric templates.
2 Overview of the Model and Solution
2.1 Problem description
Let an iris biometric X be represented as an m-bit binary string. We use Xi to denote ith bit of
such a string. We assume that the database owner compiles a database D consisting of biometric
templates X. The database is stored at one or more semi-trusted servers, which do not obtain access
to the raw data, but are trusted to perform prescribed computation correctly (i.e., using secure
multiparty computation terminology, the servers are semi-honest, which might attempt to learn
some information from the data they receive, but will not deviate from the prescribed behavior).
(This type of adversarial model is appropriate for our setting; if, however, the servers cannot be
trusted to perform the computation correctly, various techniques exist to convert a solution secure
in the semi-honest model to a solution secure in the malicious model.) A client has biometric Y and
queries the server for identiﬁcation purposes. The server (or a number of servers) execute a secure
protocol to ﬁnd all biometric templates stored in the database that match the queried biometric Y
and send the result to the client.
For all of the protocols, we assume that there is an initialization phase, Setup, that consists of
initializing the system and populating the database and the actual query execution phase, Query,
during which a client forms a query, submits it to the server, and obtains information about matches
back from the server.
In iris-based recognition, after feature extraction, biometric matching is normally performed by
computing a Hamming distance between two biometric representations. Furthermore, the feature
extraction process is such that some bits of the extracted string X are unreliable and are ignored
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mask, where its ith bit is set to 1 if the ith bit of X should be used in the matching process and
is set to 0 otherwise. For biometric X, we will use M(X) to denote the mask associated with
X. Often, a predetermined number of bits (e.g., 25%) is considered unreliable in each biometric
template. Thus, to compare two biometric representations X and Y , their Hamming distance now
takes into account the masks. That is, if the Hamming distance between two iris codes without
masks is computed as:
HD(X,Y ) =
||X ⊕ Y ||
m
,
the Hamming distance that uses masks is computed as:
HD(X,M(X),Y,M(Y )) =
||(X ⊕ Y ) ∩ M(X) ∩ M(Y )||
||M(X) ∩ M(Y )||
. (1)
Throughout this work, we will assume that the latter formula is used and simplify the notation
to HD(X,Y ). Then the computed Hamming distance is compared with a speciﬁc threshold T,
and the biometrics X and Y are considered to be a match if the distance is below the threshold,
and a mismatch otherwise. The threshold T is chosen based on the distributions of authentic and
impostor data. (In the likely case of overlap of the two distributions, the threshold is set to achieve
the desired levels of false accept and false reject rates based on the security goals.)
Finally, two biometric representations can be slightly misaligned, which is caused by head tilt
during image acquisition. To account for this, the matching process attempts to compensate for the
error and rotates the biometric representation by a ﬁxed amount to determine the lowest distance.
This rotation corresponds to circular left and right shifts of the binary representation1 a small ﬁxed
number of times, which we denote by c. The minimum Hamming distance across all runs is then
compares to the threshold. In other words, if we let LSj( ) (resp., RSj( )) denote a circular left
(resp., right) shift of the argument by a ﬁxed number of bits (2 bits in experiments conducted by
the biometrics group at our institution) j times, the matching process becomes:
min(HD(X,LSc(Y )),...,HD(X,LS1(Y )),HD(X,Y ),HD(X,RS1(Y )),...,HD(X,RSc(Y ))) < T
(2)
2.2 Security requirements
We identify the following requirements that a secure biometric search scheme must meet:
Correctness: We desire to identify and return all values that correspond to authentic matches and
minimize the number of false matches returned. That is, we target to achieve the false reject
rate (FRR) of 0 and minimize the false accept rate (FAR). This property heavily depends on
the error rate of the underlying iris codes, but, as we show in this work, can be improved via
simple means.
Eﬃciency: Communication and computation complexity of the client should be linear in the size of
its input (i.e., biometric template) and the output it receives (i.e., the number of matches).
Communication and computation complexity (including round complexity) of the servers
should be minimized if possible.
1More precisely, each biometric is represented as a two-dimensional array and during shifting a circular shift is
applied to each row. The explanation given so far, however, is suﬃcient, because if a biometric representation (even
in a scrambled form) can be partitioned into individual bits, necessary shifting can always be performed correctly.
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and the servers should not learn information about the data contained in the queries. We,
however, allow the servers to learn information about matches, i.e., the indices of the records
that matched the query and are consequently returned to the client.
The security relaxation above that allows the servers to learn information about the records (if any)
that matched the client’s query is dictated by the eﬃciency requirements. Thhe indices are then
communicated to the client, and this information is considered to be suﬃcient for the purposes how
it will be used (i.e., for the client it is crucial to know whether there is at least one match, and more
information about the matched individuals can be obtained through any other suitable mechanism
using the indices it receives). Using the terminology from work on searches over encrypted data,
this notion of security is match-revealing (as opposed to the match-concealing type).
We then can formally deﬁne security using the standard deﬁnition in secure multi-party com-
putation for semi-honest adversaries. Since the helper servers do not contribute any data to the
computation, this should be interpreted as no private input to the function they are evaluating.
Then for the purposes of the security deﬁnition, all data the servers receive before or during the
computation (i.e., the database and user queries) will be considered to be a part of the function
evaluation and therefore must not leak any information. It, however, must be understood that the
servers will be pre-loaded with some data (the biometrics database) prior to any computation takes
place. We denote “no data” by a special character ⊥. The output of each participant can include
information about query matches, but no other information.
Deﬁnition 1 Let parties P1,...,Pn engage in a protocol π that computes function f(⊥,...,⊥) =
(o1,...,on), where oi denotes output of party Pi. Let VIEWπ(Pi) denote the view of participant Pi
during the execution of protocol π. More precisely, Pi’s view is formed by its input and randomness
ri, as well as messages m1,...,mt passed between the parties during protocol execution:
VIEWπ(Pi) = (⊥,ri,m1,...,mt)
We say that protocol π is secure against semi-honest adversaries if for each party Pi there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time simulator Si such that:
{Si(f(⊥,...,⊥))} ≡ {VIEWπ(Pi),oi}
where ≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
As a special case, we have that computation can involve only one server. In this case, the security
deﬁnition must hold as well. Note that in case of multiple parties, we allow them to collude with
each other (i.e., share the information). The security guarantees must hold as long as there is a
least one party that does not participate in the collusion.
2.3 Our contributions
We distinguish between two cases when only one server or several servers can be used for biometric
search.
Single server secure biometric search SSSBS. The diﬃculty in building a non-interactive solu-
tion for the required computation securely lies in the fact that the computation involves operations
(XOR, addition, and comparison) that often require diﬀerent techniques. Note that a generic secure
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tion and communication proportional to the database size, while letting the server evaluate an
owner-generated circuit on client’s input would leak information to the server.
Our solution in the single-server setting is to employ predicate encryption. While the most
powerful existing predicate encryption schemes do not allow us to execute the required operations
exactly, we use approximations and empirically show that the error they introduce is small. This
single-server solution is not practical for large databases, but works when only one server is available.
Thus, we next build a more practical multiple-server solution when more than one server is available.
Multiple server secure biometric search MSSBS. In this setup, the database is shared among
the servers in a split form, and biometric search takes the form of a secure multi-party computation.
An interesting element of our solution is that part of the protocol uses and computes over XOR-
shared values, while the shares are consequently converted to values shared using a linear secret
sharing scheme (e.g., Shamir secret sharing scheme or additively shared data) and the computation
proceeds over them. This structure of computation allows the participants to perform a part of
the computation locally, thus reducing the communication and computation requirements. We
implement all parts of the computation (including the division) on split data. We then suggest
approximations that reduce the cost of the protocol.
Empirical validation. Empirical results constitute a signiﬁcant piece of this work. We ﬁrst apply
majority coding to improve performance of the original biometric data. The data is then used to
evaluate the accuracy of several approximation and optimization techniques, all of which, as the
results suggest, introduce only a small error.
3 Single-Server Solution
3.1 Preliminaries
For this setting, we utilize predicate encryption – a new type of encryption introduced in [19]
which allows for ﬁne-grained control over access to encrypted data. The ﬁrst public-key predicate
encryption was given in [19], and a symmetric key predicate encryption with additional privacy
guarantees was introduced in [22]. As the privacy properties we seek cannot be achieved using
public-key encryption, a brief description of predicate encryption we provide will be in the context
of the symmetric key setting.
In a symmetric key predicate encryption scheme, the owner of the master key can create and
issue secret key tokens to others. Tokens correspond to some predicates and ciphertexts are as-
sociated with attributes. Decryption of a ciphertext associated with attribute I using a token for
predicate f is successful if f evaluates to 1 on I. Predicate encryption must provide plaintext
privacy, where no information about the plaintext with attribute I can be learned using tokens
for predicates f1,...,fk that evaluate to 0 on I. Additionally, we are interested in predicate pri-
vacy achieved in [22], which ensures that, given a token for predicate I, no information about the
predicate can be discovered beyond the applications of the token to encrypted data. The most
powerful constructions of predicate encryption known to date (i.e., [19, 22]) support evaluation
of inner products (over ZN for a large integer N), which in turn enables construction of predi-
cates corresponding to disjunctions, polynomials, etc. These types of constructions can be used as
predicate-only schemes, with no messages included in a ciphertext, and this is the variant we use
in our construction.
When we use a predicate encryption scheme, we refer to it by its four algorithms, namely,
PESetup that generates public parameters and the master key, PEEncrypt that uses the master key
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secret key token for some predicate f, and PEQuery that, given a token and a ciphertext, outputs
0 or 1 which indicates the value of the predicate evaluated on the ciphertext.
3.2 Protocol
Recall that the functionality we would like to compute is given in equation 2. We use the templates
stored in the database to form ciphertexts (i.e., each template will be used to construct an attribute)
and user query data to form secret key token (to form predicates). Evaluation of the inner product
of the vector corresponding to an attribute and the vector corresponding to a predicate amounts
to testing whether the Hamming distance is below some threshold T.
As the computation that can be performed with a single invocation of a scalar product protocol
is limited, we provide a solution that computes an approximation of the computation of equation 2
and later estimate the error introduced by the approximation.
We can compute ||(X ⊕ Y ) ∩ M(X) ∩ M(Y )|| using a scalar product of vectors   x and   y, where
  x =  x1,...,x2m  =  M1(1 − 2X1),M1X1,M2(1 − 2X2),M2X2,...,Mm(1 − 2Xm),MmXm  and
  y =  y1,...,y2m  =  M1Y1,M1,M2Y2,M2,...,MmYm,Mm . This computation can be represented
as a polynomial p, where the xi’s serve the role of variables, and the yi’s the role of coeﬃcients
(or vice versa). Then to ﬁnd out whether the Hamming distance falls below the threshold T,
we form a new polynomial that allows the diﬀerence to be anywhere in the range [0,T − 1] as
q = p(p−1)   (p−(T−1)). For the computation of the minimum among all shifts, since comparisons
cannot be implemented directly within the scalar product, we employ a similar approach to the
above: we form polynomials q−c,...,qc, where qi denotes polynomial q with i amount of right shift
in biometric Y , and compute their OR by taking their product.
The given tools do not allow us to divide the computed distance by the size of the mask overlap
|M(X) ∩ M(Y )|. Therefore, we experimentally compute this size and multiply the threshold T
according to that estimate. Additionally, we consider skipping the template rotation for eﬃciency
reasons. Since both of these changes can degrade the quality of the answer, we empirically evaluate
their impact and report it in section 6.2. Our experiments indicate that such approximations can
result in a small error.
Protocol SSSBS
Setup:
1. The database owner runs PESetup using the security parameter.
2. For each X ∈ D with the corresponding mask M = M(X), represent it as a vector of length
2m formed as   x =  M1(1−2X1),M1X1,M2(1−2X2),M2X2,...,Mm(1−2Xm),MmXm . Use
  x, T, and c to form ciphertexts corresponding the desired computation with no message using
PEEncrypt.
3. Store the ciphertexts at the server.
Query:
1. Given biometric representation Y with mask M(Y ) = M, the client forms a vector of length
2m as   y =  M1Y1,M1,M2Y2,M2,...,MmYm,Mm .
2. The client sends the vector the the database owner, which uses   y, T, and c to construct
the predicate for the desired computation and generate a secret key token sky for it using
PEGenToken.
63. The client sends sky to the server.
4. The server applies this token to each ciphertext in the database using PEQuery and returns
indices (if any) of templates which could be decrypted.
3.3 Analysis
Security of this solution follows directly from the ciphertext and predicate privacy properties of the
predicate encryption scheme. That is, the values stored in the database do not leak any information
because of ciphertext privacy, and queries do not leak information because of the predicate privacy.
The only information that the server learns is the outcome of the search, as required.2 Correctness
of this approach is empirically evaluated in section 6.2.
Using this method, we store each entry in the database as a vector of size 2mT(2c + 1) + 1 (or
2mT + 1 if no shifting is used). Each biometric query is also represented as a vector of the same
size. If template rotation is not used, as an alternative, each database entry can be stored as T
randomly permuted ciphertexts (each testing for a speciﬁc value between 0 and T −1). The beneﬁt
of this approach is that the query size is now at most 2m + 1 group elements, and the server still
cannot learn any additional information about the data.
However, since the computation is proportional to the threshold T (which is normally linear in
m), this solution can lead to poor performance, especially for large databases. By allowing more
servers to participate in this computation, we can remove this factor and make other performance
improvements as described in the next section.
4 Multiple-Server Solution
4.1 Preliminaries
Notation. Given biometric representation X (which is a binary string), we use Xi to denote its
leftmost ith bit, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For a data item x, we use [x]p to denote x split among n parties using
a linear secret sharing scheme modulo p (where p is a (small) prime larger than the maximum value
that will be split among the participants). To achieve the best resilience against collusion, we will
assume that an (n,n) secret sharing scheme is used (i.e., each value is split among n parties and
all n shares are required to reconstruct it). Additive splitting is then a special case of such sharing.
We use [x]
j
p to denote the share held by party Pj. Similarly, [x]2 denotes the value x XOR-split
among n parties and [x]
j
2 the share party Pj possesses.
In our computation we also use sharings of the bits of x, i.e., [x0]p,...,[xl−1]p such that l ≤
⌈log2 p⌉, x0,...,xl−1 ∈ {0,1}, and x =
Pl−1
i=0 xi2i. We use shorthand [x]lB to denote [x0]p,...,[xl−1]p.
The length of the binary representation of x, l, is explicitly included in the notation because it may
vary for improved performance. Note that when l = 1, the sharings of x and its bitwise decompo-
sition coincide, i.e., [x]1B = [x]p. We will denote ⌈logp⌉ as ℓ and use l for bitwise representations
when l  = ℓ.
Known techniques. Throughout this work, we will use notation [x]p ← rss(x) to denote creation
of n random shares of x using a linear secret sharing scheme. The properties of such schemes
allows parties to add, subtract, and multiply by a constant split values without any interaction.
Additionally, eﬃcient (constant-round) protocols for computing a product of two shared values
exist for standard linear secret sharing schemes; we denote multiplication as [ab mod p]p ←
2The server might also be able to approximate the values of parameters m, T, and c from the ciphertexts it stores,
but such values are a part of the algorithm and normally would not be considered secret.
7mult([a]p,[b]p). Following [9], we evaluate performance of our protocols in terms of the number of
multiplication protocols. That is, round complexity will be expressed as the number of sequential
invocations of the multiplication protocol and communication complexity as the overall number of
mult invocations.
In this work, we use some protocols from [9], which are:
bits: given a shared value [x]p, performs bit decomposition x  → (x0,...,xℓ−1), where xi ∈ {0,1}
for i = 0,...,ℓ − 1, x =
Pℓ−1
i=0 xi2i. As a result of execution of bits, parties receive shares
[x0]p,...,[xℓ−1]p. The protocol takes a constant number of rounds and O(ℓlogℓ) invocations
of mult protocol.
bit-lt: given two shared values [x]lB and [y]lB, performs bitwise less-than and outputs shared bit
b = (x
?
< y), where b = 1 iﬀ x < y and 0 otherwise. The length l does not have to be
equal to the length of the prime p. The protocol takes a constant number of rounds and O(l)
invocations of mult protocol (and uses smaller constants than the bits protocol).
Also, prior techniques allow us to perform unbounded fan-in multiplication in constant rounds to
compute ([a1]p,[a1a2 mod p]p,...,[a1a2    at mod p]p) ← mult(a1,a2,...,at). The complexity of
such protocol is O(t) invocations of the conventional multiplication protocol.
Security. In order to construct our MSSBS protocol, we will utilize a number of protocols, each of
which is secure in our adversarial model. Thus throughout this section, we make an extensive use
of the composition theorem which states that the composition of secure protocols remains secure
(and was proven in [6]). The security of our solution then reduces to ensuring that sub-protocols
that we design or use are secure against semi-honest adversaries.
4.2 Overall protocol
Our MSSBS protocol uses sub-protocols that are described in detail after presenting the overall
solution. These sub-protocols are:
convert: given XOR-shares of a value x, [x]2, produces a value y split using a linear secret
sharing scheme, [y]p, where y corresponds to the sum of the XOR shares of x, i.e., y =
[x]1
2 + [x]2
2 + ... + [x]n
2.
lsb: given a value split using a linear sharing scheme [x]p, produces a bit split using a linear sharing
scheme, [b]p that corresponds to the least signiﬁcant bit of x.
batch-add: given a number of values split using a linear secret sharing scheme, [x1]p,...,[xt]p,
produces shares of their sum [s]ℓB. Each input can be a bit (i.e., [xi]1B) or a larger value split
modulo p.
batch-min: given a number of values in binary representation [x1]ℓB,...,[xt]ℓB, computes the
minimum element [y]ℓB of the set.
div: given a dividend [v]ℓB and a divisor [d]ℓB, computes the unique quotient [q]ℓB such that
v = dq + r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ d − 1.
Our MSSBS protocol follows the computation of equation 2. The database is stored among the
servers in an XOR-shared way and the client also distributes XOR shares of her query. Part of the
computation proceeds on XOR-shared data, which is then converted to shares modulo p for the
target secret sharing scheme to proceed with the rest of the computation.
8Because the computation involves division, we need to discretize the data instead of operation
on ﬂoating point values. For that reason, once the Hamming distance is computed, the result is
multiplied by some value h which represents the desired level of precision. That is, the division will
be computed as
⌊(h   ||(X ⊕ Y ) ∩ M(X) ∩ M(Y )||)/(||M(X) ∩ M(Y )||)⌋
and is compared to the integer threshold ⌊h   T⌋. In what follows, we will assume that T already
corresponds to its integer representation for the desired precision.
Protocol MSSBS
Setup: The database D is distributed to n parties P1,...,Pn in a shared form such that Pj, 1 ≤
j ≤ n, holds [Xi]
j
2 and [M(X)i]
j
p for every X ∈ D and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Parties P1,...,Pn also receive c,
h, and [T]ℓB.
Query:
1. Client computes sharings [Yi]2 and [M(Y )i]p, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, from Y and M(Y ), respectively,
and communicates [Yi]
j
2, [M(Y )i]
j
p to Pj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
2. For each X ∈ D, run in parallel:
(a) For each k = −c,...c, run in parallel:
i. Each Pj locally performs a circular shift of its shares of Y according to the value of
k and the step size of the shift.
ii. Each Pj locally computes [Zi]
j
2 ← [Xi]
j
2 ⊕ [Yi]
j
2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
iii. P1,...,Pn execute [Zi]p ← convert([Zi]2) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
iv. P1,...,Pn execute [ai]1B ← lsb([Zi]p) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
v. P1,...,Pn execute [bi]1B ← mult([M(Y )i]p,[M(X)i]p) and [ci]1B = mult([ai]1B,[bi]1B),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
vi. P1,...,Pn execute [d]ℓB ← batch-add(h[c1]p, ...,h[cm]p) and [e]ℓB ← batch-add([b1]1B,
...,[bm]1B).
vii. P1,...,Pn execute [qk]ℓB ← div([d]ℓB,[e]ℓB).
(b) P1,...,Pn execute [u]ℓB ← batch-min([q−c]ℓB,...,[qc]ℓB).
(c) P1,...,Pn compare the result with the threshold by executing (u
?
< T) ← bit-lt([u]ℓB,[T]ℓB).
3. For each X ∈ D that returned 1, P1 sends X’s index in D to the client.
This protocol assumes that the precision value h is a part of algorithm and is public. If this is not
the case, the protocol can be easily modiﬁed to work with a split value. Then during the setup, h
will be distributed to the participants as [h]p, and during the query execution, computation h[ci]p
will be replaced with mult([h]p,[ci]p).
4.3 Sub-protocols
We now describe implementation of the sub-protocols listed in the previous section.
94.3.1 Converting between types of secret sharing
The following protocol simply distributes each currently held share among the participants using
a secret sharing scheme, and each participant computes her new share as the sum of all n values.
Protocol [y]p ← convert([x]2)
1. Each Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, creates [ai]p ← rss([x]i
2) and communicates [ai]
j
p to Pj.
2. Each Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sets [y]i
p ←
Pn
j=1[yj]i
p mod p.
Correctness of this protocol follows from the properties of linear secret sharing schemes. The same
holds in case the values are additively split. Privacy follows from the fact that only secure operations
are used and all computation is performed on the shares.
4.3.2 Computing the least signiﬁcant bit
The least signiﬁcant bit functionality can be implemented very eﬃciently in constant rounds using
the idea for evaluating symmetric boolean functions from [9]. Since the output of lsb(x) is ﬁxed
for all possible values of x (0 ≥ x ≥ n), we create pairs (xi,f(xi)) for all values xi in the range
(i.e., f(x) = 1 for an odd x and f(x) = 0 for an even x). By Lagrange interpolation, we construct
a polynomial with coeﬃcients a0,...,an such that lsb(x) ←
Pn
i=0 aixi mod p for x ∈ {0,...,n}.
Since the polynomial depends only on the number of parties n, it can be constructed by each party
in advance.
Protocol [b]1B ← lsb([x]p)
1. P1,...,Pn compute ([x]p,[x2 mod p]p,...,[xn mod p]p) ← mult([x]p,...,[x]p).
2. Each Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sets [b]i
1B ← (
Pn
j=0 aj[yj mod p]i
p) mod p.
The complexity of this protocol is that of the multiplication protocol of fan-in of n, i.e., the
communication complexity is O(n) mult protocols. Privacy follows from the fact that only secure
tools are used.
We can also implement the same functionality by hierarchically computing a sequence of XORs,
which would result in a protocol that requires logn rounds but with lower communication and
computation complexity (but still O(n)). We leave the details of such a solution to the reader.
4.3.3 Computing batch addition
Given the existing tools, there is a natural way to implement batch addition in a constant number
of rounds, which we give next. Such a protocol requires O(ℓlogℓ) invocations of the mult protocol
due to its use of the bits protocol.
Protocol [s]ℓB ← batch-add([b1]p,[b2]p,...,[bt]p)
1. Each Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sets [s]i
p ←
Pt
j=1[bj]i
p.
2. P1,...,Pn compute [s]ℓB ← bits([s]p).
Note that in the MSSBS protocol, batch addition is executed both on bits and larger values. When
the values bi’s are very small, another, hierarchical implementation of this function can be built
using varying-length representation of the intermediate sums, which is likely to be more eﬃcient,
but will require logt rounds of communication. We omit details here. As before, privacy of this
protocol follows directly from the primitives used to construct it.
104.3.4 Computing batch minimum
This protocol proceeds in a hierarchical manner using the number of rounds logarithmic in the
number of inputs. All comparisons are done using protocol bits-lt that works on arguments in
bitwise form. Then to compute the minimum of two values x and y, we use b = (x
?
< y) to set
min(x,y) = b   x + b   y. Since multiplication is deﬁned only on values split using the linear secret
sharing scheme rather than shares of bitwise representations, it is natural to compute the minimum
by converting x and y to shares modulo p, performing the multiplication, and calling bits on the
result to obtain bitwise representation for the next comparison. In our case, however, one operand
of multiplication is a bit, which allows us to multiply bits directly in the bitwise representation.
That is, we deﬁne [c]ℓ ← mult∗([b]1B,[x]ℓB) as multiplication of each bit of x with b. Formally,
[ci]p = mult([b]p,[xi]p) for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1.
In what follows, we use notation ai,j to denote the minimum of elements xi through xj. To
simplify the description, we will assume that the number of inputs t is a power of 2; this assumption
can be easily removed in practice.
Protocol [y]ℓB ← batch-min([x1]ℓB,...,[xt]ℓB)
1. Set [aj,j]ℓB = [xj]ℓB for 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
2. For i = 1,...,logt − 1, for j = 1,...,t/2i−1
(a) P1,...,Pn compute [b]p ← bit-lt([a(j−1)2i+1,(j−1)2i+2i−1]ℓB,[aj2i−2i−1+1,j2i]ℓB);
(b) P1,...,Pn set [a(j−1)2i+1,j2i]ℓB = mult∗([b]p,[a(j−1)2i+1,(j−1)2i+2i−1]ℓB) +
mult∗(not([b]p),[aj2i−2i−1+1,j2i]ℓB).
3. Set [y]ℓB = [a1,t]ℓB.
In the above, not([b]p) = [1]p − [b]p. Communication complexity is O(tℓ) due to t − 1 invocations
of bit-lt protocol, which are performed in logt rounds. Privacy, as before, follows from the fact
that all used subroutines are secure and the composition theorem.
4.3.5 Performing division
Privacy-preserving division protocols have previously appeared in [1] and [5]. The former uses
the Newton approximation method and the latter implements the conventional division algorithm
(using a series of subtractions). Both are designed for two-party computation using homomorphic
encryption. Here we follow the structure of the division algorithm from [5], but implement is using
diﬀerent tools for multi-party computation.
The algorithm computes one bit of the quotient at a time, starting from the most signiﬁcant
bit. It tests whether subtracting 2ℓ−id from the current remainder for the current value of i would
result in a negative remainder or not. If the result is non-negative, the ith of the quotient is set
to 1 and the remainder is decremented by 2ℓ−id; otherwise, the bit is set to 0 and the remainder
is unchanged. We set the (binary) value Fi to 1 if 2id < p and to 0 otherwise. Note that in this
case, conversion between regular and bitwise shares of intermediate results cannot be avoided due
to the fact that the shared values get reduced modulo p, which cannot be transparently achieved
using bitwise representation.
Protocol [q]ℓB ← div([v]ℓB,[d]ℓB)
1. P1,...,Pn locally compute [v]p =
Pℓ−1
i=0 2i[vi]1B and [d]p =
Pℓ−1
i=0 2i[di]1B.
112. P1...,Pn compute [F1]p ← bit-lt(bits([p − 1]p − 2[d]p),bits([p]p − [d]p)).
3. For i = 2,...,ℓ − 1, P1,...,Pn compute:
(a) [Fi]p ← bit-lt(bits([p − 1]p − 2i[d]p),bits([p]p − 2i−1[d]p));
(b) [Fi]p ← mult([Fi−1]p,[Fi]p).
4. P1,...,Pn locally set [R1]p = [v]p and compute [R′
1]p = [R1]p − mult([Fℓ−1]p,2ℓ−1[d]p).
5. P1,...,Pn compute [O1]1B = bit-lt(bits([R′
1]p),[v]ℓB).
6. For i = 2,...,ℓ, P1,...,Pn compute:
(a) [Ri]p = [Ri−1]p − 2ℓ−i+1mult([Oi−1]p,[d]p);
(b) [R′
i]p = [Ri]p − mult([Fℓ−i]p,2ℓ−i[d]p);
(c) [Oi]p = bit-lt(bits([R′
i]p),bits([Ri]p)).
7. Set [qi−1]p = [Oi]p for i = 1,...,ℓ.
Round complexity of this algorithm is O(ℓ) and communication complexity is O(ℓ2 logℓ) invocations
of mult protocol. (Note that the communication complexity of the instantiation of the division
protocol in [5] is O(K3), where K is the security parameter of a homomorphic public-key encryption
scheme and thus is at least by an order of magnitude larger than ℓ; the round complexity is Ω(K).)
Privacy follows from security of the building blocks.
4.4 Analysis
In our analysis we distinguish between overhead of the client and computational servers per execu-
tion of Query protocol. For the client, communication consists of sending the shares of the biometric
to the servers and therefore is O(nm). The communication received as a result of the computation
is proportional to the number of matches (and therefore is small, if non-zero).
For each participating server, communication per each records X in the database involves
communicating O(cmn) bits and participating in O(cn + cℓ2 logℓ) multiplication protocols using
the total of O(logc + ℓ) rounds. If the division operation can be approximated with small error
(which, as we show in Section 6, is the case), the servers’ round and communication complexity
reduces to O(logc) and O(cn+ℓlogℓ) mult protocols plus O(cmn) bits, respectively. Furthermore,
if the shifting can also be skipped when computing the Hamming distance (which also a very realistic
assumption, see Section 6), this further reduces to O(1) round complexity, O(ℓlogℓ) mult protocols
and O(mn) bits of communication.
Security of the protocol follows from the fact that no intermediate results are revealed to the
participants, security of the tools used, and the composition theorem.
5 Using Approximations to Reduce Cost
As eﬃciency is one of our main goals, it seems natural to apply approximation algorithms to improve
the computation or communication used per comparison with a database record. In particular, the
protocols we described in the previous sections examine all m bits of each biometric and compute
all operations whenever possible, while an approximation might involve only a fraction of that work
at the expense of some error in the computation. Here our goal is not to use an approximation
12algorithm to replace all of the computation, but rather have a faster way to ﬁlter out most of
records that deﬁnitely constitute a mismatch. In other words, the computation can be performed
in two stages:
1. Run an approximation algorithm to ﬁlter out the majority of records;
2. Run the exact algorithm to ﬁlter out mismatches within the error of the approximation
algorithm.
This two-stage matching process might allow us to tolerate a larger error with more coarse and
faster approximations than using a solely good approximation algorithm. If the approximation is
fast enough on the majority of the records, the average time spent per record has the potential
to signiﬁcantly go down. Recall that we are interested in the FRR of 0 and in as low a FAR as
possible (i.e., return all authentic records that matched and as few mismatches as possible).
In recent years, several results appeared that permit private evaluation of approximations with
provable bounds of the error [14, 15, 16]. There are two main reasons, however, why prior solutions
cannot be directly applied here. First, they assume that, in two-party computation, one party
holds one database and the other party holds another database, and the computation produces an
approximation of the distance between the databases. In our case, no party has access to either
string being compared, which rules out some of the approaches used (in particular, the sublinear
hashing scheme of [14, 15]). Second, such approximation (more precisely, sampling) algorithms
result in savings only when the size of the string is very large. In our case, the size of the data
string m is rather small (12800 bits in our database, commercial software produces iris codes of 2048
bits), and even setting the error bounds to generous values results in the number of sampled bits
to be signiﬁcantly larger than m. Thus, we chose to depart from the theoretical bounds and, as the
initial step, empirically evaluate the sampling technique on smaller values. We report the results
of experiments in Section 6.2.3 and leave more involved approximation algorithms as a direction
for future work.
6 Experimental Validation
In this section we report on the experiments we conducted to estimate the accuracy of the tech-
niques. As is evident from the prior description, some of our techniques introduce errors in the
matching process, and we are interested in estimating and minimizing the errors they introduce.
All data reported in this section should be treated as an initial attempt to gain insight into the
impact of approximations on the performance of biometric matching and corresponding error rates.
A wider-scale experimentation is needed to make more reliable conclusions about the trends we
observe.
For the purposes of this work, the experiments were run on biometric data from 170 subjects,
each having about 50–100 biometric samples. Authentic data were gathered using multiple biomet-
ric representations for each individual, and impostor data were gathered by pairwise comparisons
between diﬀerent individuals. Thus, the volume of impostor comparisons signiﬁcantly exceeds the
data collected for authentic comparisons.
6.1 Widening the gap between authentic and impostor distributions
As a ﬁrst step in the experimentation, we attempt to increase the gap between authentic and im-
postor distributions by using repeated sampling and majority encoding for each bit in the biometric
representation, as suggested in [10]. The goal is to have a gap between the authentic and impostor
distributions so that the errors introduced by approximations will fall within the gap rather than
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Min Max Avg St dev Min Max Avg St dev
Original 0.002 0.553 0.289 0.123 0.083 0.744 0.374 0.080
MC-5 0.121 0.492 0.311 0.092 0.233 0.5670 0.422 0.044
MC-9 0.119 0.479 0.281 0.075 0.241 0.5720 0.421 0.043
MC-13 0.126 0.386 0.243 0.062 0.263 0.5580 0.422 0.044
MC-17 0.108 0.348 0.224 0.052 0.257 0.5700 0.422 0.043
MC-21 0.108 0.326 0.215 0.051 0.250 0.5610 0.422 0.044
MC-25 0.116 0.319 0.204 0.049 0.242 0.5630 0.421 0.044
MC-29 0.104 0.297 0.188 0.047 0.266 0.5590 0.423 0.044
MC-33 0.103 0.299 0.172 0.046 0.228 0.5500 0.422 0.044
Table 1: Performance of Any-Support-Alg majority algorithm on authentic and impostor data.
cause larger overlap of such distributions. This technique was theoretically evaluated (in [10]) on a
diﬀerent number of samples used for majority encoding (assuming an error rate of 10% for authentic
data). Such analysis implies that the noise is uniformly distributed over the code, which is not true
for biometric data, i.e., some bits are more likely to stay consistent over multiple acquisitions than
other. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that empirically evaluates eﬀectiveness
of this technique (as far as we know, this rather simple technique is not used (or even known) in
the biometric community).
While the idea of this technique is very simple, applying it to iris codes is less straightforward
than it might seem due to usage of masks and template rotation in the matching process. In
particular, given a number of templates, only a subset of them can have any particular bit marked as
reliable (this also implies that it is no longer guaranteed that the majority will be computed using an
odd number of bits). Furthermore, it might be desirable to pre-align the biometric representations
used in computing the majority template prior to performing majority encoding.
For the purposes of this work, we designed two algorithms for computing majority codes, which
we describe next. Suppose we are given k iris codes (for an odd k) and would like to compute a
majority code using them. For each jth bit of the biometric representations (1 ≥ j ≥ m), let bij
denote the jth biometric bit from the ith code and bj the computed majority bit. Similarly, we use
mij to denote the jth mask bit of the ith code and mj the corresponding mask bit in the majority
code. The ﬁrst algorithm, to which we refer as Any-Support-Alg, sets the mask bit mj to 1 if a least
one bit among the mij’s (1 ≥ i ≥ k) is equal to 1. The bit bj is then set to the majority of the bij’s
that had the corresponding mask bit set to 1 (when their number is even and there is no majority,
it is set to 0). The second algorithm, to which we refer as Threshold-Support-Alg, sets the mask bit
mj to 1 only if the number of templates that have this mask bit set is above a certain threshold
(which we set to k/4). Furthermore, if the number of templates with the set mask bit exceeds the
threshold, but there is no majority among such bij’s, mj is also set to 0. We provide pseudo-code
for these algorithms in Appendix A.
Tables 1 and 2 show performance of these algorithms in comparison to the original matching (the
exact numbers for the original data can slightly diﬀer between the tables as they were produced
using a randomized subset of the original biometrics). In the tables, MC-k stands for majority
code computed from k iris codes. We also illustrate performance of Any-Support-Alg in ﬁgures 1
and 2. As is evident from the tables and ﬁgures, applying either majority algorithm enlarges
the distance between the authentic and impostor distributions and also decreases the variance
of both distributions. Both of these outcomes are expected. What is also very important for our
application is that the maximum error for authentic comparisons drops signiﬁcantly and takes values
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Min Max Avg St dev Min Max Avg St dev
Original 0.002 0.605 0.295 0.135 0.015 0.654 0.375 0.082
MC-5 0.019 0.521 0.243 0.116 0.148 0.609 0.398 0.063
MC-9 0.068 0.478 0.242 0.090 0.186 0.585 0.407 0.055
MC-13 0.077 0.416 0.217 0.078 0.202 0.579 0.408 0.053
MC-17 0.085 0.470 0.194 0.070 0.191 0.571 0.411 0.051
MC-21 0.076 0.354 0.188 0.061 0.220 0.576 0.414 0.050
MC-25 0.062 0.301 0.182 0.054 0.213 0.572 0.414 0.050
MC-29 0.046 0.303 0.171 0.054 0.234 0.566 0.416 0.049
MC-33 0.067 0.321 0.166 0.054 0.211 0.558 0.416 0.048
Table 2: Performance of Threshold-Support-Alg majority algorithm on authentic and impostor data.
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Figure 1: Authentic comparisons with Any-Support-Alg.
signiﬁcantly lower than most values for impostor error. To gain better understanding how these
ﬁndings align with theoretical analysis (which assumes uniformly distributed noise), we provide it
here for the value of 0.29 (the original error rate for authentic data). The theoretically expected
error rate for the majority code would then be:
MC-5 MC-9 MC-13 MC-17 MC-21 MC-25 MC-29 MC-33
0.150 0.087 0.053 0.033 0.021 0.013 0.008 0.005
which is clearly very diﬀerent from the actual data we see.
Threshold-Support-Alg provides slightly better separation between the means of authentic and
impostor data than Any-Support-Alg, but has a higher variance. Also, Any-Support-Alg stabilized
the impostor data very quickly (with virtually no changes as the number of templates used during
the computation of the majority codes increases), but did not appear to have signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the authentic data when a small number of templates were used to form majority codes. One
advantage of Any-Support-Alg is that it produces biometric codes with a much higher number of
mask bits set than the original biometric representations. This allows us to approximate division
with high precision as we show in the next section.
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Figure 2: Impostor comparisons with Any-Support-Alg.
6.2 Validating accuracy of approximation algorithms
We now proceed with the empirical evaluation of diﬀerent types of approximations described in
this work on the iris codes computed using the majority algorithms. Recall that the single-server
solution does not implement the division operation, and this is what we evaluate next. We also
investigate the eﬀect of skipping the template rotation, as well as report the results of applying
sampling techniques on the majority iris codes in order to reduce computational cost of biometric
search solutions.
6.2.1 Division
As was mentioned above, the Any-Support-Alg majority algorithm produces codes with very high
percentage of mask bits set (i.e., much higher than 75% in the original codes). The small variance
in the mask size thus makes it ideal for approximating the division operation. That is, instead of
dividing the distance between two codes by the mask overlap size, we multiply the threshold T,
with which the hamming distance is compared, by a constant that corresponds to the average mask
overlap size. Since the distribution of mask overlap sizes for authentic comparisons diﬀer from the
distribution of impostor comparisons, we consider averaging the means and using such value in
approximating division as described above.
Table 3 shows the distribution of mask overlap sizes produced on authentic and impostor com-
parisons that used majority codes (generated by Any-Support-Alg majority algorithm), from the
total of m = 12800 bits. As can be seen from the table, the variance reduces dramatically as the
number of templates k used to compose majority codes increases. As the beneﬁts of such majority
algorithms are most pronounced on larger values of k (and can bear very small advantage oth-
erwise), if such algorithms are deployed, we expect that rather high values of k to be used (e.g.,
20 and above). In such cases, the spread of mask overlap values is minimal: for instance, when
k = 21 the mask overlap sizes range from 12620 to 12800 across all of impostor and authentic
comparisons. This means that the maximum error that division approximation can produce is
bounded by 180/12800 or 1.4%. Furthermore, for most comparisons the error will be even lower
due to the uneven distribution of the mask overlap sizes, which are higher concentrated near the
upper bound. Figure 3 illustrates mask overlap size distribution for select cases. We chose to plot
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Min Max Avg St dev Min Max Avg St dev
Original 0.148 0.740 0.484 0.121 0.125 0.838 0.469 0.167
MC-5 0.911 1.272 1.153 0.078 0.816 1.272 1.090 0.108
MC-9 1.131 1.280 1.246 0.029 1.139 1.280 1.218 0.037
MC-13 1.238 1.280 1.267 0.011 1.212 1.280 1.251 0.018
MC-17 1.258 1.280 1.271 0.006 1.240 1.280 1.263 0.011
MC-21 1.267 1.280 1.275 0.004 1.262 1.280 1.271 0.005
MC-25 1.268 1.280 1.276 0.004 1.261 1.280 1.271 0.006
MC-29 1.273 1.280 1.277 0.002 1.268 1.280 1.275 0.004
MC-33 1.273 1.280 1.277 0.002 1.271 1.280 1.276 0.003
Table 3: Mask overlap size of comparisons of iris codes (in 104 bits) with Any-Support-Alg.
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Figure 3: Distribution of mask overlap size for impostor comparisons with Any-Support-Alg.
mask overlap sizes corresponding to impostor data because they have larger spread than values of
authentic data.
6.2.2 No shifting
The next type of experiments we performed is to estimate the error introduced by skipping the shift-
ing and minimum operations. As the iris codes in our database are rather well-aligned (i.e., ﬁnding
the minimum value among all shifts for authentic data often results in choosing the original code
with no shifting), the expected error is small. Table 4 shows the results of such an approximation.
If we compare these results with the data reported in Table 1, it is clear that the diﬀerence is
small. The average distance for impostor data increased by over 4% in all cases (and signiﬁcantly
higher when no majority coding is used), while it is increased by about 2% for authentic data
(except when no majority coding is used). This tells us that (i) the eﬀect of shifting is higher on
the original data than when majority coding is used and (ii) with majority coding, the eﬀect of
shifting is higher on impostor data than authentic data (i.e., shifting is more likely to accidently
lower the Hamming distance of impostor data than bring authentic codes closer by aligning them).
The variance, however, is larger in all cases in Table 1 than in Table 4, but not signiﬁcantly larger.
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Min Max Avg St dev Min Max Avg St dev
Original 0.027 0.691 0.360 0.161 0.103 0.867 0.477 0.111
MC-5 0.121 0.584 0.332 0.099 0.253 0.720 0.473 0.060
MC-9 0.119 0.484 0.302 0.077 0.256 0.680 0.466 0.058
MC-13 0.136 0.436 0.269 0.069 0.254 0.689 0.466 0.059
MC-17 0.108 0.453 0.238 0.066 0.267 0.696 0.467 0.060
MC-21 0.108 0.373 0.222 0.058 0.251 0.686 0.467 0.060
MC-25 0.119 0.311 0.210 0.050 0.256 0.713 0.467 0.060
MC-29 0.104 0.318 0.198 0.050 0.265 0.657 0.468 0.060
MC-33 0.103 0.330 0.192 0.054 0.253 0.676 0.468 0.060
Table 4: Performance of Any-Support-Alg on authentic and impostor data when no shifting is used
during computation of Hamming distance.
Authentic Impostor
Min Max Avg St dev Min Max Avg St dev
Original 0.021 0.992 0.373 0.193 0.028 1.068 0.459 0.152
MC-5 0.108 0.620 0.343 0.106 0.192 0.805 0.490 0.068
MC-9 0.124 0.495 0.306 0.081 0.278 0.699 0.477 0.060
MC-13 0.138 0.444 0.272 0.069 0.244 0.695 0.472 0.059
MC-17 0.109 0.453 0.240 0.067 0.275 0.681 0.470 0.059
MC-21 0.108 0.375 0.223 0.058 0.256 0.687 0.469 0.060
MC-25 0.120 0.312 0.215 0.051 0.273 0.687 0.469 0.060
MC-29 0.105 0.319 0.200 0.051 0.267 0.690 0.468 0.059
MC-33 0.104 0.331 0.192 0.054 0.262 0.678 0.468 0.060
Table 5: Performance of Any-Support-Alg on authentic and impostor data when no division and no
shifting is used during computation of Hamming distance.
Finally, to obtain the full picture of the performance of the optimized SSSBS protocol, we
combined approximations for division with skipping the shifting. Table 5 shows statistics for au-
thentic and impostor comparisons when mask overlap size was approximated by a constant during
division and no shifting was used during the computation of Hamming distance. As can be seen
from the table, even by applying both of these approximation to the majority codes, the results
still signiﬁcantly outperform the performance of original data (with no majority coding) using the
precise computation. When these approximations are used on the original data, however, the per-
formance is very poor (due to the large eﬀect of approximating division and removal of minimum
computation on such data). Thus, we conclude that such approximations are feasible not only
for the single-server case, but can also be used to signiﬁcantly reduce the computation cost of the
multi-server solution.
6.2.3 Sampling
The purpose of this last section is to gain insights on how reducing the number of bits used in the
computation of the Hamming distance reduces the accuracy of the matching. These experiments
were run on diﬀerent values for the sample size s < m. Given s, during each comparison, a random
subset of size s was chosen from the m bits, while the rest of the computation proceeded unchanged.
As an interesting implementation issue, the care must be taken when such a subset is chosen not to
18Authentic Impostor
Min Max Avg St dev Min Max Avg St dev
Original 0.000 0.720 0.379 0.183 0.068 0.955 0.474 0.123
MC-5 0.101 0.591 0.339 0.108 0.150 0.777 0.471 0.069
MC-9 0.105 0.541 0.291 0.080 0.146 0.747 0.465 0.065
MC-13 0.119 0.446 0.262 0.074 0.150 0.696 0.464 0.065
MC-17 0.085 0.350 0.228 0.061 0.159 0.681 0.463 0.066
MC-21 0.092 0.365 0.215 0.066 0.123 0.700 0.465 0.066
MC-25 0.115 0.320 0.208 0.056 0.242 0.696 0.467 0.067
MC-29 0.104 0.296 0.192 0.054 0.262 0.695 0.469 0.066
MC-33 0.073 0.288 0.178 0.054 0.250 0.677 0.468 0.066
Table 6: Performance of Any-Support-Alg with the sample size s = 260.
interfere with the circular shifts. Our biometric representations are stored as 20 × 640 bit arrays,
and we draw s/20 columns at random during each comparison. Doing so does not disrupt the
row-wise shifting. Also, since an excessive amount of shifting reduces impostor distance more than
authentic, in our experiments the amount of shifting c was scaled down with the size of the sample
set (e.g., c = 2 for s = m/10 and c = 1 for s = m/20).
Table 6 presents the results of applying the sampling technique to iris data with the sample
size of 2% of the original bitlength m, s = 260. As the data suggest, while the original biometric
templates were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by this approximations, the templates computed using majority
coding still exhibited a very stable behavior.
To evaluate the overhead of the two-stage search process described in Section 5, we compute
the overlap of the authentic and impostor distributions as the percent of the impostor comparisons
that fall below the maximum value of authentic Hamming distances. The table below shows such
numbers for diﬀerent values of the sample set s using majority codes with good performance.
Sample size MC-21 MC-25 MC-29 MC-33
s = 12800 2.01% 1.36% 0.28% 0.36%
s = 640 7.00% 1.50% 1.20% 0.18%
s = 260 6.50% 1.26% 0.50% 0.48%
Given the above, it is clear that a small sample size can be used to ﬁlter out a great majority of
false matches, after which a rigorous comparison can be conducted on the remaining records. This
would result in vast communication savings of the MSSBS protocol and computational savings of
the SSSBS protocol.
7 Conclusions
This work motivates the problem of secure computation of biometric matching when neither the
database nor the biometric value being searched for is available in the clear to the server. We
give solutions to the problem for iris codes, where we distinguish between a single-server solution,
SSSBS, and a multiple-server solution, MSSBS. We also study various types of approximations, due
to eﬃciency reasons or inability to perform required operations, using a database of iris codes and
achieve favorable results.
As this is the ﬁrst work in this direction, many interesting problems remain. For example,
other types of approximation algorithms beyond simple sampling are worth exploring. This work
19concentrated on iris codes, but many other types of biometric data remain. Finally, larger-scale
experimentation with biometric data is needed to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of this work and further
explore eﬀect of applying diﬀerent majority algorithms to biometric data.
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A Majority Algorithms
Let b1,...,bk denote the ith bit of biometric representations used in forming the template, and
m1,...,mk denote the ith mask bit in the corresponding representations. The algorithms for
forming ith biometric bit b of the template and its corresponding mask bit m proceed as given
below.
Any-Support-Alg:
1. n0 := 0
2. n1 := 0
3. for (i from 1 to k) {
214. if (mi = 1) then
5. if (bi = 0) then n0 := n0 + 1
6. else n1 := n1 + 1
7. }
8. if (n1 = 0 and n0 = 0) {
9. m := 0
10. b := 0
11. }
12. else {
13. m := 1
14. if (n1 > n0) then b := 1
15. else b := 0
16. }
This simple algorithm sets the mask bit to 0 if at least one mask bit mi is set. The biometric bit
is set according to the majority of bits marked as reliable and to 0 is no majority exists.
Threshold-Support-Alg:
1. c :=
Pk
i=1 mi
2. if (c ≤ ⌊k
4⌋) then {
3. m := 0
4. b := 0
5. }
6. else {
7. n0 := 0
8. n1 := 0
9. for (i from 1 to k) {
10. if (mi = 1) then
11. if (bi = 0) then n0 := n0 + 1
12. else n1 := n1 + 1
13. }
14. if (n0 = n1) then {
15. m := 0
16. b := 0
17. }
18. else {
19. m := 1
20. if (n0 > n1) then b := 0
21. else b := 1
22. }
23. }
In the above algorithm, when suﬃcient evidence of bit reliability cannot be gathered, the mask
bit is set to 0 and the biometric bit itself is set to 0. If, however, the biometric bit is used in
any computation or analysis regardless of the mask bit value (i.e., to evaluate distributions of bits
in templates), it is more accurate to set the bit in the same way as in the case when the bit is
considered to be suﬃciently reliable. Then the same algorithm as in the outer else clause (lines
7–22) should be used for this case with the exception that the mask bit is never set to 1.
22